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CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: 
AN ANALYSIS, 1960-1989 
Megan Presnak and Frank Boyd* 
Political Science Department, Illinois Wesleyan University 
Central banks are instrumental to shaping and implementing monetary policy in both 
industrialized and developing countries. They affect exchange rates, interest rates, and 
the success of private banks within their home country. A vast amount of research has 
been devoted to looking at the autonomy of central banks in developed countries and 
factors that affect their autonomy. Research suggests that a high level of informal central 
bank independence, as opposed to legal, or formal, central bank independence is a 
precondition for macroeconomic stability in developing countries. This study aims to 
examine the behavior of central banks in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The evidence presented in this article suggests that the legal autonomy of a central bank 
in sub-Saharan Africa cannot solely account for its policymaking capacity. On the other 
hand, the measure of informal independence, central bank governor turnover, appears to 
have little explanatory power, with respect to bank capacity either. This research implies 
that further research must employ alternative measures of central bank independence in 
order to explain fluctuations in exchange rates. Central bank independence in sub­
Saharan African countries is driven mainly by the political climate, as opposed to the 
economic climate. 
